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Villemez: First Amendment and the Law Enforcement Agency: Protecting the Em

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY: PROTECTING THE
EMPLOYEE WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE

The following item appeared in a widely circulated Wyoming newspaper on April 7, 1983:
A U.S. District Court jury ruled Wednesday that
former Natrona County Sheriff Bill Estes fired two
former deputies in retaliation for exercising their rights
of free speech.
The verdict came after two days of deliberation by a
jury in Cheyenne.
The panel of four men and two women ordered
Estes to pay the two former deputies, Mark Hamilton
and Johnny Daniels, damages of $4,609.44 each for a
total judgment of $9,218.88.
Hamilton and Daniels claimed they were fired by
Estes on June 5, 1981, for cooperating in investigations
of incidents in the sheriff's office and because he blamed
them for leaks of those incidents to the news media.'
FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH-FOUNDATION
FOR PROTECTING THE WHISTLE BLOWER

Throughout most of the history of the United States, the
public employee who was brave enough or crazy enough to call
attention to wrongdoing within his agency discovered that his
speech merited no protection in the courts. 2 His superior was
free to dismiss, demote, or reprimand him, since public
employment was considered a privilege, not a right. 3 The
courts adhered steadfastly to the doctrine expressed by Justice
Holmes in his well-known statement: "The petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no con' 4
stitutional right to be a policeman.
Copyright© 1983 by the University of Wyoming.
1. Barron, Jury Rules in Favorof Deputies, Casper Star-Tribune, Apr. 7, 1983, at Al, col.

1.
2. Miller, Whistle Blowing and the Law, in WHISTLE BLOWING, THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 27 (Nader, Petkas & Blackwell eds. 1972).
3. Comment, The UnclearBoundariesof the ConstitutionalRights of PublicEmployees, 44
U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 389, 389 (1976).
4. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). The court
upheld the dismissal of a policeman who had violated departmental regulations against

joining political committees or soliciting funds for political purposes. Id., 29 N.E. at 518.
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It was not until the mid 1950's that the United States
Supreme Court began to apply the Bill of Rights to public
employees. In Slochower v. Board of Higher Education5 the
Court held that a public school teacher could not be discharged
for invoking the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination before a congressional subcommittee investigating subversive influences in the educational system.,
By 1967, the Court had formally rejected the notion that the
state has unlimited power to set conditions on public employment. In Garrityv. New Jersey, the Court held that the fifth
amendment applies to policemen as well as teachers 8 and concluded that "policemen . . . are not relegated to a watereddown version of constitutional rights." 9 Today, restrictions
still exist on the ability of public employees to exercise first
amendment rights. Government workers who blow the whistle
on agency wrongdoing continue to be subjected to retaliation
in the form of discharge, suspension, and demotion.
Statutory Protection
Since 1979, public employees at the federal level have enjoyed the protection of a "whistle blowers' statute." 10 This
provision, which was enacted as part of the Civil Service
Reform Act," shields government employees who disclose information which they reasonably believe evidences a violation
of the law or mismanagement, waste, abuse of authority, or a
substantial danger to public health or safety.12 Because whistle
blowers reveal wrongdoing that would otherwise go
undetected and because they often encounter economic and
professional loss, Congress gave the Merit Systems Protection
350 U.S. 551 (1956).
Id. at 553, 559.
385 U.S. 493 (1967).
Id. at 499-500.
Id. at 500. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), in which the
Court struck down a New York law that required removal of university faculty members
for "treasonable or seditious" acts. Id. at 597, 604. The Court quoted with approval the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals: "[Tlhe theory that public employment which may be
denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable,
has been uniformly rejected." Id. at 605-06.
10. 5 U.S.C. S 2301(bX9) (Supp. V 1981).
11. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5, 10, 15, 28, 31, 38, 39, 42 U.S.C.
12. 5 U.S.C. S 2301(bX9) (Supp. V 1981).
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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Board 13 and Special Counsel 14 the authority and duty to protect federal employees who call attention to agency abuses.16
At least two states have enacted statutes that expressly

protect the whistle blower. In 1980, Michigan passed a comprehensive act 1 6 that prohibits employers in both the public
and private sectors from discharging or otherwise
discriminating against an employee on the ground that he has
reported an unlawful activity to a public body.17 An Alaskan
statute protects school teachers who criticize school personnel,

school board members, or any other public official outside of
school hours. I8 The state and federal statutes provide coverage

limited to their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, the vast
majority of public employees' 9 at the state and local level must

rely exclusively on the first amendment guarantee of freedom
of speech20 to protect their interests should they choose to
reveal information that incriminates their superiors.
The PickeringBalancing Test

Every case in which a public employee claims he was
dismissed for activity protected by the first amendment must
be analyzed in light of Pickering v. Board of Education.2 ' In
that case, the United States Supreme Court established a

balancing test in which "the interests of the [employee], as 22
a
citizen, in commenting upon the matters of public concern"
are weighed against "the interest of the state, as an employer,

in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
13. 5 U.S.C. SS1201-1203, 1205-1209 (Supp. V 1981).
14. 5 U.S.C. SS 1204, 1205-1208 (Supp. V 1981).
15. S. REP. No. 95-969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2723, 2730. Each year about one thousand cases, alleging the affirmative defense
of whistle blowing, are filed with the Merit Systems Protection Board. Katz, EPA, Whistle Blower Tangle Over Criticism,68 A.B.A. J. 1064 (1982). The office of Special Counsel
has been unsuccessful in establishing this defense, a fact which led Congresswoman
Patricia Schroeder to introduce a bill, H.R. 6392, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), to abolish
the controversial office. Katz, Do Whistle Blowers Have Enough Protection?68 A.B.A. J.
1065 (1982).
16. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. SS 15.361-.369 (1981).
17. See Franck, Curb That Whistle! 61 MICH. B.J. 106 (1982), for a brief discussion of the act
as it applies to professions in which confidentiality is a major concern.
18. ALASKA STAT. S 14.20.095 (1982).
19. Private employers are not restricted by the first amendment in regulating the speech of
employees because of an absence of state action. See WHISTLE BLOWING! (Westin ed.
1981) for a collection of whistle-blowing stories from the private sector.
20. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech ..
" U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
21. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
22. Id. at 568.
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through its employees. ' 2 3 Pickering, a teacher, was dismissed
for sending a letter to a local newspaper which criticized the
Board of Education and the superintendent for their handling
of bond elections and their allocation of school funds. 2 4 The
Court recognized the possibility of an infinite number of variations on Pickering's particular factual situation and declined to
lay down a general standard against which all critical
statements by public employees could be judged. 25 However, in
concluding that Pickering's speech was protected under the
first amendment, the Court developed guidelines which lower
courts have followed in balancing the employee's interests
against those of the state:
1. Consideration must be given to the working relationship between the employee and the person criticized. If the
employee's statements are directed toward someone with
whom he would normally come in contact during his working
day, the likelihood of disruption of discipline by superiors or
harmony among co-workers is increased. Public criticism by a
subordinate is less likely to be protected in employment relationships that demand personal loyalty and confidence to func26
tion properly.
2. The nature of the employee's speech is a significant factor. An item of legitimate public concern, disclosed by a
knowledgeable worker, is likely to merit constitutional protection. The Court stressed the importance of encouraging free
and open debate, which promotes intelligent choice by the
27
electorate.
3. The fact that an employee's statements are false does
not render them per se detrimental to the operation of the
department. The ease with which erroneous statements can be
countered and their overall impact on the public must be
weighed.2
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

564.
569.
569-70.
571-72.
570-72.
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Once an outspoken employee survives the balancing test
and his communication is deemed to be protected, the standard
of protection is that of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.2 9 That
standard requires "proof of false statements knowingly or
recklessly made," 30 before the employee may be subjected to
retaliatory dismissal.3 1 Thus, the government employee whose
speech is protected under Pickering is treated as though he
were a member of the general public. He is free to criticize
32
public officials at will, so long as he does so without malice.
Restrictions Imposed by the Mt. Healthy Test
If a public employee is terminated for engaging in
activities protected under Pickering, the employer can still
prevail in an action for reinstatement or damages by showing
that the employee would have been removed even in the
absence of the protected conduct. 33 In Mt. Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle, 34 conduct clearly protected by the first amendment 5 precipitated the school
board's decision to discharge teacher Doyle. However, conduct
which was not protected also afforded grounds3 6 for his
removal. The issue was whether the fact that the protected activity played a "substantial part" in the decision to dismiss
constituted a violation of the first amendment.3 7
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the fact that protected conduct played a part in the decision to dismiss did not
amount to a constitutional violation so long as the board would
have reached the same decision had the protected behavior not
occurred. 38 This holding was necessary, the Court reasoned, to
avoid granting the incompetent employee a ready means of
saving his job. A test that focused solely on whether protected
conduct played a part in the decision to terminate could place
29. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. at 574 (1968).

31. Id. at 573-74.
32. Id. at 574.
33. Note, Free Speech and Impermissible Motive in the Dismissal of Public Employees, 89
YALE L.J. 376, 376-77 (1979).
34. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
35. Doyle revealed the contents of an intraschool memorandum regarding the faculty dress
code to a local radio station. Id. at 282.
36. Doyle continually engaged in altercations with other teachers, cafeteria workers, and
students. Id. at 281-82.
37. Id. at 285.
38. Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1983

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 18 [1983], Iss. 2, Art. 14

794

LAND & WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVIII

the employee who engaged in protected behavior in a better
position than he would have been in had he done nothing. 9
The Mt. Healthy Court set forth a two-part test for determining whether a public employee has been removed from his
position in violation of the first amendment:
1. The initial burden is on the employee to show that his
conduct was constitutionally protected and that this conduct
was a substantial factor in his removal.
2. The burden then shifts to the government employer to
show that the employee would have been dismissed even in the
absence of the protected conduct.40
While the Mt. Healthy test serves as a potential aid to
employers in wrongful discharge suits, the test has not played
an important role in whistle-blowing cases. The reason for this
apparent paradox is that the public official responsible for
dismissing an employee generally acknowledges that the decision to terminate was based solely on the whistle-blowing
employee's communications to the media, his superiors, or
other agencies. In the structured environment of a police
department or sheriff's office the disruption and the
breakdown in discipline caused by the recalcitrant subordinate's speech is deemed by his superior to justify any
retaliatory action. 41 Moreover, the whistle blower often has an
exemplary record within the department, affording the
employer no other grounds upon which to base dismissal. Consequently, the Pickering balancing test, unmodified by Mt.
Healthy, functions as the tool for analyzing whether a decision
to discharge a particular government employee violated the
first amendment.
39. Id. at 285-86.
40. Id. at 287. Two years later, in Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410
(1979), the Court reformulated this test as the "but for" test. Even though protected activity constituted the"primary" reason for a decision to dismiss, to justify a fding of unconstitutional dismissal, the trier of fact must determine that the employee would have
been retained but/or his protected behavior. 439 U.S. at 417. For a critical analysis of the
Court's "but for' test, see Note, supra note 33.
41. It should be kept in mind that these communications unquestionably would be protected
by the first amendment were the speaker a member of the general public rather than a
governmental employee. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. at 573-74 (1968).
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SCOPE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT
To BLOW THE WHISTLE

Since, under Pickering,an employee's freedom to disclose
the wrongdoing of his associates or superiors must be balanced
against the government's interest in maintaining an efficiently
operating department, the scope of the right to blow the whis2
tle will depend on the balance struck by the particular court.'
In weighing the interests of the parties in the area of law enforcement, 43 courts have focused on two factors as being of
particular significance: the nature of the employee's speech
and his intended recipient.
Public Disclosure of Matters of Strong Public Concern
In Williams v. Board of Regents44 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals emphasized the fact that the employee had disclosed a matter of grave public concern. 45 Consequently, a showing that the communication had caused departmental disrup46
tion and disharmony was not a per se defense to dismissal.
Williams, a lieutenant in the University of Georgia police
force, had written a letter to his superiors protesting their
alteration of an accident report concerning the city chief of
police. Williams discussed the alteration with his father, who
then revealed the incident to the press. Williams was fired as a
result of the leaked report. 47 In a civil rights action 48 against
the university, chief of police, and others, the jury awarded
49
Williams compensatory and punitive damages.
42. Comment, Government Employee Disclosures of Agency Wrongdoing: Protecting the
Right to Blow the Whistle, 42 U. CH. L. REV. 530, 537 (1975).
43. Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1970), was one of the first circuit court decisions
subsequent to Pickering to rule on an employee's right to call attention to wrongdoing
within a police department. The case is significant because the court expressly held that
the Picketing
balancing test was not limited to public school situations, but was applicable to employment relationships in the law enforcement context as well. Id. at 904.
Lower courts since Muler v. Conlisk have applied Pickering to a variety of public
employment situations. See Note, Nonpartisan Speech in the Police Department: The
Aftermath of Pickeing, 7 HASTING S CONSr. L.Q. 1001, 1011 (1980).
44. 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926 (1981).
45. Id. at 1003.
46. Id. at 1004.
47. Id. at 995-98.
48. The employee in these cases typically brings an action against his employer under 42
U.S.C. S 1983 (1976), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
49. 629 F.2d at 998.
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On appeal, the university argued that evidence of two of
the Pickering defenses, "the necessity of discipline in a quasimilitary organization and the breakdown of the working relationship between superior and subordinate," should have been
admitted at trial and their validity should have been determined by the jury. 50 The court recognized the availability of the
Pickering defenses and the importance of harmony in employment relationships and proper job performance. 51 The court
found, however, that where first amendment rights are at
stake, the balancing of52interests between the employee and the
state is for the court.
Despite the fact that Williams' conduct was certain to lead
to disruption in the department, and despite the fact that
discipline is essential to a well-run police force, the gravity of
Williams' communication tipped the scales in favor of first
amendment protection. The court ruled that where the matter
is of legitimate concern to the public, as is the falsification of
police records for the protection of an official, "the employee's
right to speak must be vigorously protected if the public is to
53
be informed."1
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting from the United States
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the case, 54 felt that the
circuit court did not give sufficient weight to the need for
maintaining discipline and control in a law enforcement agency. Since Williams' speech impugned the integrity of his immediate superiors, evidence as to the breakdown of the
employment relationship and the necessity of police department discipline should have been admitted, according to the
dissent.55
In Choudhry v. Jenkins,5 6 the Seventh Circuit attributed
considerable weight to the public's right to know about conditions that affect public safety. Choudhry, a correctional officer
at the state prison, was discharged after he called members of
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id. at 1002-03.
Id. at 1003.
Saye v. Williams, 452 U.S. 926, 929 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
559 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977).
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the press to his home to comment on the inadequacy of security precautions at the prison. 57 In weighing the strong need for
maintenance of discipline in the prison setting against the
employee's right to speak out, the court found the public's interest in prison security conditions to be the crucial factor
favoring protection of such disclosures. 58
5 9 the Third Circuit reviewed the
In Sprague v. Fitzpatrick,
case of the First Assistant District Attorney of Philadelphia
County who had been discharged for revealing to the press the
untruthfulness of the District Attorney's disclaimers regarding a controversial sentencing recommendation.6 0 The court
discounted the significance of the public's right to know and
reached a result contrary to that reached in Williams and
Choudhry.

In balancing the assistant's interest in free speech against
the likely harm to the state's provision of service, the court
gave primary weight to the working relationship between the
criticizing employee and the person criticized.6 1 The First
Assistant District Attorney was characterized as the "alter
ego" of the District Attorney.62 The court held that the fact
that the disclosed information concerned matters of "grave
public import" did "not tilt the Pickering balance in favor of
first amendment protection where, as here, the effectiveness
of the employment relationship between employee-speaker
63
and employer-target is so completely undermined."
Since an employment relationship based on loyalty and
respect is necessary for an effective police department as well
as an effective district attorney's office, the divergent results
reached by the Sprague and Williams courts may be explained
by comparing the weights that the courts attributed to the
public's right to information. The Sprague court reasoned that
an informed and aroused public that aggravates the disruptive
situation within a department weighs against, not for, first
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 1086-88.
Id. at 1089-90.
546 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 562, 565.
Id. at 565.
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amendment protection under Pickering.64 The Williams court,
on the other hand, emphasized the need for governmental
65
agencies that are accountable to a knowledgeable electorate.
In Kannisto v. City and County of San Francisco, 66 the
Ninth Circuit presumed that the public officer's comments had
a substantial, disruptive influence on the daily operation of the
agency. 67 Kannisto, a lieutenant in the police department, was
suspended from duty for making derogatory comments about a
superior officer to his subordinates during morning
inspection.6 8 The court held that Kannisto's speech was unprotected, but emphasized in dicta that an important factor to
be weighed in the Pickeringbalance is the right of the public to
be informed.6 9 As a member of the police force, Kannisto was
particularly able to communicate departmental deficiencies to
the public.70 However, in this case, where Kannisto's remarks
were simply disparaging and disrespectful and were made, not
to the public, but during the regular performance of his duties,
not override the
the public's interest in being informed could
71
generated.
remarks
the
which
disruption
Thus, Kannisto is consistent with Williams and Choudhry.
Under all three cases the significance of the communication in
relation to the public's legitimate interest in the performance
of its law enforcement agencies determines the likelihood of
protection under Pickering. Where disharmony within the
department appears to be the purpose, rather than an unfortunate side effect, of the speech, the court may be reluctant to
find first amendment protection.
Communication of Intra-DepartmentalConcerns to Ultimate
Superiors
The courts are in disagreement as to whether the public
employee who solicits the aid of a superior governing body in
redressing perceived misconduct within his agency deserves
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 566.
629 F.2d at 1003.
541 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
Id. at 844.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 843.
Id.
Id. at 844.
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protection under the first amendment. In Clary v. Irvin,7 2 the
Chief of Police dismissed three policemen for communicating
to city council members their concerns regarding the Chief's
mishandling of his duties. 73 The federal court of the eastern
district of Texas, in applying the Picketing balancing test, attached significance to the fact that the police officers had
revealed their concerns to the city council, the only body with
power to dismiss the Chief. The court determined that, as
public employees, the police officers had the right, even the
duty, to comment on inept performance within the department
in an effort to remedy the situation.7 4 Since the officers had
spoken with the council members on an informal basis, the
court found that the privacy of the communication minimized
any disruption within the department and, therefore, weighed
in favor of the terminated employees. 5
A recent Tenth Circuit case indicates that private communication by a public employee will not be protected if it
results in discord within the department. In Key v.
Rutherford,8 the chief of police spoke with the mayor and city
manager regarding budget grievances. The chief was discharged for violating a departmental rule that prohibited employees
from discussing grievances with city council members. 77 The
trial court ruled the provision unconstitutional on its face. This
ruling was in error, according to the circuit court, as the provision should have been evaluated under the Pickeringbalancing
test. 7
The court identified two situations in which it is permissible for the state to regulate an employee's right to speak: (1)
speech which disrupts the employment relationship, and (2)
speech which does not concern matters of public interest.7 9
The court determined that the chief's communications involved a matter of public interest and, therefore, satisfied one
72. 501 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Tex. 1980).

73. Id. at 706-07.
74. Id. at 709.

75. Id. at 711.
76. 645 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1981).
77. Id. at 881-84.

78. Id. at 884. Although the Tenth Circuit stated that the rule was to be evaluated according
to Picketing, on remand the district court was directed to balance the competing interests presented by the particular factual situation. Id. at 885.
79. Id. at 884.
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criterion for protection. However, the circuit court found that
should the district court determine on retrial that the content
of the chief's speech or his method of communication
"significantly interfered" with his ability to function as chief
of police or with the efficient operation of the police department, such speech would not merit protection under the first
amendment.8 0
Thus, the Tenth Circuit requires for first amendment protection that an employee's speech concern a matter of public
interest, even though it is made to members of the city council
in an effort to privately correct a perceived wrong. In addition,
speech that results in significant disruption within the agency
will not be afforded protection. Instead of engaging in a true
balancing of the competing interests to determine whether the
whistle blower deserves protection, the Tenth Circuit appears
to attribute veto weight to a finding of either significant
departmental discord or absence of public interest.
Disclosure of Violations of the Law to Investigatory and
Enforcement Authorities
The courts look with favor upon the private disclosure of illegal acts to the appropriate authorities.8 In Simpson v.
Weeks,82 police officer Simpson was demoted for conferring
with the attorney representing city prisoners in their civil
rights action against the chief of police.8 3 The Eighth Circuit
ruled that the award to Simpson of punitive damages was supported by the evidence, 8 4 since the interests of the officer as a
subpoenaed witness in a court proceeding in discussing relevant matters with the attorney associated with the case
outweighed the interests of the police department in maintaining silence.8 5
The federal district court of the eastern district of Pennsylvania in Hoopes v. City of Chester86 went so far as to con80. Id. at 885.
81. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Allender, 520 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (court upheld a police
officer's constitutional right to report allegations of police misconduct to the F.B.I.).
82. 570 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911 (1979).
83. Id. at 241.
84. Id. at 243.
85. Id. at 242.
86. 473 F. Supp. 1214 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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elude that the Pickeringbalancing test is not appropriate when
the federal interest in encouraging disclosure of possible violations of federal crimes is implicated.8 7 Chief of Police Hoopes
was demoted for his assistance in the federal criminal investigation and prosecution of the mayor, his immediate
superior.8 8 The city relied heavily upon Sprague v.
8 9 claiming that the mayor's removal of Hoopes
Fitzpatrick,
was justified by the fact that the effective working relationship
between the two was completely undermined. The court,
however, was concerned that effective law enforcement might
be frustrated if potential witnesses, fearing demotion or termination, were reluctant to cooperate with investigative
authorities.90 The court found, therefore, that Pickering was
not controlling. 91

ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

It is not surprising that the lower courts arrive at
divergent results when applying the Pickering balancing test.
The Supreme Court intended the test to be a flexible one,
capable of application to a nearly infinite variety of factual
situations. However, the inconsistent results reached by the
lower courts when analyzing similar factual patterns suggest a
need for specific direction from the Court.93 The lower courts
are in agreement that the private disclosure of a violation of
the law to the appropriate investigatory or enforcement
authority merits constitutional protection. 94 It is in the areas
of disclosure of employment-related concerns by public
employees to the media and to their ultimate superiors that the
courts are split. 95
87. Id. at 1223.
88. Id. at 1215-18.

89. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
90. Hoopes v. City of Chester, 473 F. Supp. at 1223 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
91. Id.
92. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. at 569 (1968).

93. See Note, supra note 43, at 1003 for an argument that the lack of uniformity among the
lower courts produces a chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment rights by
government employees.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 81-91.

95. See supra text accompanying notes 44-80.
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The decision of a court whether to afford a whistle blower
first amendment protection is a function of both the content 96
of a communication and the identity of the recipient of that
communication.9 7 Since any disclosure of a negative nature
will precipitate disruption within an agency, the balance struck
by a particular court depends on the weight that court attributes to the public interest in the content of a given
disclosure. 98 This public interest factor is directly related to
the public's right to be informed of misfeasance within an
agency and the right to assume that public employees will attempt to remedy serious departmental deficiencies. Choudhry
v. Jenkins is an obvious example of a case involving strong
public interest. 99 Members of the public had a right and need to
know about prison security measures as they affected the safety of the community. An equally clear example of a situation in
which legitimate public interest is minimal is the case involving
personality conflicts or petty disputes within an agency. 100 The
majority of cases, of course, lie between these two extremes,
involving budgetary concerns, alterations of records, mendacity, and the like. In these areas, courts have examined parallel
factual situations and reached opposite results, based on the
importance the court attributes to the public interest factor. 10 1
The public's right to information is an important concept
underlying the Pickering balancing test. 10 2 The Court in
Picketing stressed the need to encourage free and open debate
among the electorate.10 3 Even erroneous statements by a
public employee are to be judged according to the strict New
96. The Supreme Court has determined that the content of the speech of the ordinary citizen
can be regulated only under strictly confined circumstances. See Landmark Communica-

tions, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842-45 (1978) (speech posing a clear and present
danger); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,307-08 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (speech to a captive audience); Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.s. 726, 748-50 (1978) (speech broadcast over radio and television).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 42-91.

98. First amendment freedom of speech includes both the right to speak and the right to
receive speech. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
99. 559 F.2d 1085.
100. Trivial, vitriolic remarks have not merited first amendment protection by the lower
courts. See Magri v. Giarusso, 379 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1974).
101. Compare Williams v. Board of Regents, 629 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980) uith Sprague v.
Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1976); Compare Clary v. Irvin, 501 F. Supp. 706 (E.D.
Tex. 1980) with Key v. Rutherford, 645 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1981).
102. When Pickeringwas decided in 1968, the notion that public employment could not be subjected to unlimited conditions was still relatively new. Therefore, the Supreme Court took
pains to emphasize the public interest component of the balancing test.

103. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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York Times Co. v. Sullivan standard.10 4 The rationale behind
the Court's emphasis on the public interest factor is twofold.
First, the public employee is likely to be especially
knowledgeable concerning his agency. He has access to unpublicized information and is aware of intangible elements
within the agency, such as the operating philosophy of his
superiors. Often he has formed definite opinions as to ways in
which the agency could perform more effectively. Second, the
public agency is, by definition, supported by public funds. The
public has a legitimate interest in the manner in which these
funds are spent. Moreover, public officials are often elected.
Informed decisionmaking by the electorate is enhanced when
public employees are encouraged to reveal misfeasance within
their department.
In recent years the Supreme Court has expanded the concept of the public's right to information. This expansion has occurred in diverse fields. In VirginiaState Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,' °5 the Court
recognized the interest of the particular consumer and the interest of society in general in the free flow of commercial information. 10 6 More recently, the right of secondary school
students to receive ideas was upheld by the Court in Board of
Education v. Pico.10 7 Until certiorari is granted in a whistle-

blowing case, the Supreme Court's expansion of the public interest notion in other contexts should guide lower courts when
called upon to apply the Pickeringbalancing test.
Proponents for curtailing the speech of law enforcement
employees point to the importance of discipline and conformity
in such departments. 108 Police and sheriffs' departments have
been described as quasi-military agencies which demand unquestioning obedience to fulfill their designated purposes. 10 9 It
has been argued that government employers would be seriously hampered in performing their essential functions if
104. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
105. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
106. Id. at 763-64. The Court held unconstitutional a state statute banning the advertising of
prescription drug prices. Id. at 770.
107. __
U.S.
, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 2808 (1982).
108. Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d at 565 (3d Cir. 1976); Brukiewa v. Police Comm'r, 257
Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210, 218 (1970).
109. Saye v. Williams, 452 U.S. at 929 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Muller v. Conlisk, 429
F.2d at 904 (7th Cir. 1970).
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employees were allowed to disclose incriminating information
at will.110 The argument, however, loses sight of the appropriate relationship between the public and public servants.
The existence of powerful law enforcement agencies contemplates an electorate sufficiently informed to control abuses
of power by these agencies. As the court pointed out in
Williams, agency wrongdoing "must be disclosed to the public
if the people are to remain the true sovereigns in this
country.""11
CONCLUSION

Conflicts between the rights of law enforcement
employees to blow the whistle on agency wrongdoing and the
importance of a smoothly operating department are beginning
to surface in Wyoming. Application of the Pickering test to
these sorts of conflicts has led to divergent results among the
lower courts in other parts of the country. Since the disclosure
of any substantial misconduct will cause disruption and disharmony within an agency, the decision to afford first amendment
protection to such disclosures will depend on the weight a particular court attributes to the public's right to know. So far,
the Supreme Court has been content to allow inconsistent
results among the lower courts to stand. Fifteen years after
Pickering, a definite statement as to the permissible
parameters of the balancing test is needed.
JANE A.B. VILLEMEZ

110. Comment, supra note 42, at 560.
111. 629 F.2d at 1003 (emphasis in original).
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